TAG: Todd Humphreys

Directions 2013: The Future of GNSS Security

December 1, 2012By

The GNSS interference session this year at the ION-GNSS conference in Nashville was one of the most crowded, confirming the need of all sectors of the community to understand the threats in GNSS and how they can be mitigated. In that context I received one of the most challenging questions of my career: “Can we predict the future of GNSS security?” What is the status of civil and commercial GNSS security today? Which are the threats and risks and how they are mitigated? Where are we going and what shall we expect from the future? read more

Future Visions from the GNSS Oscar Winners

October 3, 2012By

At the magazine’s annual Leadership Dinner, held during the ION-GNSS Conference, we gave the first GNSS Leadership Awards to four individuals for their respective work in the four fields of satellites, signals, services, and products. We asked each recipient to give us a vision of the future: upcoming work, whether that’s something they plan to undertake or they think someone... read more

Drone Hack: Spoofing Attack Demonstration on a Civilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

August 1, 2012By
drone_toc-650

By Daniel Shepard, Jahshan A. Bhatti, and Todd E. Humphreys  Unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) used in the spoofing tests; owned by the University of Texas.  A radio signal sent from a half-mile away deceived the GPS receiver of a UAV into thinking that it was rising straight up. In this way, the UAV’s dependence on civil GPS allowed the... read more

Going Up Against Time: The Power Grid’s Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks

August 1, 2012By
Figure 7. Oscilloscope and Synchrowave screen at about 870 seconds, point 4 in Figure 3.

Spoofing tests against phasor measurement units demonstrate their vulnerability to attack. A generator trip in an automatic control scheme could be falsely activated by the GPS spoofing, possibly leading to cascading faults and a large-scale power blackout. read more

This article is tagged with , , and posted in Timing, Wireless Infrastructure

Detecting False Signals with Automatic Gain Control

April 1, 2012By
FIGURE 6. Google Earth view of testing environment.

A component of most GPS receiver front-ends, the automatic gain control (AGC) can flag potential jamming and spoofing attacks. The detection method is simple to implement and accessible to most GPS receivers. It may be used alone or as a complement other anti-spoofing architectures. This article presents results from a baseline AGC characterization, develos a simple spoofing detection method, and demonstrate the results of that method on receiver data gathered in the presence of a live spoofing attack. read more

Innovation: Know Your Enemy

January 1, 2012By
Inno-Opener

Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS Jammers
GPS jamming is a continuing threat. A detailed understanding of how the available jammers work is necessary to judge their effectiveness and limitations. A team of researchers from Cornell University and the University of Texas at Austin reports on their analyses of the signal properties of 18 commercially available GPS jammers. read more

Straight Talk on Anti-Spoofing: Securing the Future of PNT

January 1, 2012By
Spoofing

Disruption created by intentional generation of fake GPS signals could have serious economic consequences. This article discusses how typical civil GPS receivers respond to an advanced civil GPS spoofing attack, and four techniques to counter such attacks: spread-spectrum security codes, navigation message authentication, dual-receiver correlation of military signals, and vestigial signal defense. Unfortunately, any kind of anti-spoofing, however necessary, is a tough sell. read more