TAG: spoofing

Letter to the Editor: Automatic Gain Control, Spoofing

July 1, 2012By

Just for the record: what is reported in “Detecting False Signals With Automatic Gain Control” (April GPS World) is what we introduced a long time ago and is reflected in one of our videos, and implemented in all of our GNSS receivers. AGC information is one of the four ways, and the least significant way, that we show interferences. There is a big difference between showing something in the laboratory and in some receivers, compared with having technology in mass production that everyone can understand and use. — Javad Ashjaee read more

This article is tagged with , , , and posted in Opinions, Simulators & Tools

Detecting False Signals with Automatic Gain Control

April 1, 2012By
FIGURE 6. Google Earth view of testing environment.

A component of most GPS receiver front-ends, the automatic gain control (AGC) can flag potential jamming and spoofing attacks. The detection method is simple to implement and accessible to most GPS receivers. It may be used alone or as a complement other anti-spoofing architectures. This article presents results from a baseline AGC characterization, develos a simple spoofing detection method, and demonstrate the results of that method on receiver data gathered in the presence of a live spoofing attack. read more

Innovation: Know Your Enemy

January 1, 2012By
Inno-Opener

Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS Jammers
GPS jamming is a continuing threat. A detailed understanding of how the available jammers work is necessary to judge their effectiveness and limitations. A team of researchers from Cornell University and the University of Texas at Austin reports on their analyses of the signal properties of 18 commercially available GPS jammers. read more

Straight Talk on Anti-Spoofing: Securing the Future of PNT

January 1, 2012By
Spoofing

Disruption created by intentional generation of fake GPS signals could have serious economic consequences. This article discusses how typical civil GPS receivers respond to an advanced civil GPS spoofing attack, and four techniques to counter such attacks: spread-spectrum security codes, navigation message authentication, dual-receiver correlation of military signals, and vestigial signal defense. Unfortunately, any kind of anti-spoofing, however necessary, is a tough sell. read more

Expert Advice: Test-Based Civil Receiver Certification

December 1, 2011By

Disaster-preparedness plans recognize the individual’s role in his or her own survival. When storms approach, have water, food, and basic survival gear on hand. It takes time for help to arrive. The civil GPS industry faces an oncoming storm of interference, and the receiver is the first line of defense. As we integrate GPS into all facets of our lives and infrastructure, we become more subject to disruptions, both unintentional and intentional. Newark International Airport now sees several jamming events per day. In Taiwan, one airport experiences an average of 117 events per day! read more

Car Jammers: Interference Analysis

October 1, 2011By
Opening-Photo

Open-field tests of jamming signals from widely available in-car jammers, measured with an experimental software receiver that records the intermediate frequency (IF) samples, enable a detailed analysis of interference effects from these looming threats. read more

This article is tagged with , and posted in Road, Transportation

Tamper Resistance

April 1, 2011By
P-1

Modern GNSS will provide access control to the signal through spreading-code encryption and/or authentication at the navigation data level. This will require support within the receiver for secure cryptographic keys and the implementation of security functions. This article reviews vulnerabilities of these security functions, and reviews design considerations to mitigate attacks. read more

This article is tagged with and posted in Government, Public Safety, Security & Surveillance, Transportation

Spoofing Detection and Mitigation with a Moving Handheld Receiver

September 1, 2010By
Nielsen-Opener

A single spoofing source has a different spatial signal distribution from the authentic GPS signal. An antenna array can estimate the spatial distribution of the received signal and thus discriminate the spoofing signal from the authentic one. Moving a handheld receiver with a single antenna during signal capture snapshots produces a form of a synthetic array, highly effective in discriminating spoofing signals sourced from a point-source jammer. read more

This article is tagged with , , and posted in Receiver Design