Letters to the Editor

DAGR Remarks

In the April edition, an article titled “DAGR Extended” covered news from the Space & Missiles Center regarding the GPS Wing awarding a follow-on contract to Rockwell Collins to provide Defense Advanced GPS Receivers (DAGR).

At the end of the article appeared an “Unofficial Word,” which made derogatory and inaccurate remarks about the use of the DAGR.

We are disappointed that the staff of GPS World did not contact us for a response to the accusations made in the article. Had you contacted us, our response would have been the following:

The DAGR provides the only means for dismounted soldiers or special operators to obtain location information of sufficient accuracy, reliability, and integrity for targeting purposes. Our warfighters use the DAGR to call in close air support missions, which the DAGR delivers GPS-guided munitions with pinpoint accuracy through its Advanced Laser Range Finder and Fire Support functions. The DAGR also provides unique Gun Laying Azimuth Determination applications.

Use of a commercial GPS in these circumstances would entail significant risk that would be totally unacceptable. No other handheld GPS is authorized, nor should it be authorized, for use in military targeting operations.

In the combat theater, our soldiers and special operators are working in extremely difficult conditions — environmental conditions where the DAGR functions consistently and provides warfighters with the information they vitally need.

On April 30, we celebrated the delivery of the 300,000th DAGR, which is proven testimony to the utility and reliability of the product.

In the future, we’d appreciate an opportunity to respond firsthand.

— Robert Haag
Senior Director, Soldier Solutions
Rockwell Collins

Don Jewell, Military & Government Editor, replies:

I could not agree with you more. At the same time, I totally disagree with your comment that our remarks were “derogatory and inaccurate … about the use of the DAGR.”

The conclusions drawn in that “Unofficial Word” (not, by the way, written by me) came directly from several industry and government warfighter panels (many of them attended by Rockwell Collins), face-to-face interviews, letters, and a plethora of personal e-mails from warfighters over the last 24 months. The results were unanimous: the DAGR, according to our warfighters who have opted not to use it, is too big, too heavy, has limited battery life, a black-and-white screen, is basically obsolete, and has a very difficult, definitely not user-friendly interface. Our interviews and correspondence show that the DAGR, as a standalone device, has been replaced by various GPS handheld or wrist-mounted units, Garmin and Trimble primarily.

How can I then agree with your comments? Because your letter very carefully only defends the use of the DAGR as an embedded device. Indeed it has been our experience that the only warfighters that consistently give the DAGR high marks are the soldiers using the DAGR as an embedded device: those responsible for directing fire — bombs or artillery on target. In a recent interview session with more than 40 soldiers, only the soldier responsible for directing fire said that he used the DAGR in any capacity. He stated, “For directing fire I use my DAGR because it has the necessary interface for laser designators and communications to direct fire. Other than that, I depend on my Garmin, as does everyone else I know, for a personal GPS unit. The Captain uses the DAGR as an input to the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system that stays in the Humvee or Stryker vehicle.”

As I, and many others, in many articles, have said all along, the DAGR as an embedded piece of equipment, with dual frequencies, encryption, and approved government interfaces, serves a necessary and critical function: supplying BFT information and directing fire. As you correctly point out, it is the only approved government PNT source for directing fire. That is a good thing; all information and interfaces needed for the direct-fire mission have been worked out and do not need to be duplicated. Warfighters directing fire use the DAGR because there is no alternative, but for every other purpose for which they rely upon handheld GPS equipment, the DAGR is found seriously wanting. Suffice it to say the design is more than 14 years old, and the unit was dated when first released.

I have spoken to several Rockwell Collins representatives about my concerns and those of the warfighters over the years, and usually they do not dispute the DAGRs’ shortcomings. However, recently I was shown a picture, by a senior Rockwell Collins representative, of a new Rockwell Collins government GPS unit that impressed me as much as a simple picture of a GPS unit can. I asked for more information and a unit to review and I am still waiting. My problem, and I say this in all sincerity, is not with Rockwell Collins, as I know you built the DAGR to outdated government specifications that were generated in the early 1990s; by Moore’s law that is more than seven generations old by today’s standards. My primary concern is the safety and welfare of our warfighters. I know you can do much better, but the antiquated and non-responsive government acquisition system has prevented you from making changes and updating the poorly designed user interface. Rockwell Collins makes tremendous radios and avionics, which I used successfully throughout my 30-year military career, except for PLGR and DAGR units, which I consistently found to be inferior.

I consider myself a sophisticated GPS user and have tested more than 80 individual GPS units from manufacturers around the globe, yet I find your equipment and interface totally confusing. So please help me. Send me the new proposed government equipment with the color screen, the new interface, and hopefully new capabilities, and I will gladly review it in the magazine.

Several of my articles have helped gain waivers from the U.S. government for official use of thousands of commercial and civilian GPS handheld units in theater, mostly military-hardened Trimble units. If you have a great new handheld unit, then please send me an example to review and I will do that. Maybe we can get official waivers to use it in theater. I sincerely hope that is the case.
The soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the U.S. military have voted by purchasing their own units or by obtaining waivers. Even the newest recruits, whose low salary qualifies them for state assistance and food stamps, spend their money on commercial GPS units. As a very distinguished friend and world-renowned GPS expert said recently in a public forum, “You may not know it, but there has been an unofficial competition among military users for GPS handheld units, and Garmin won.” You have delivered 300,000 DAGRs, but how many of those units are actually in use today as stand-alone devices?

GAO Report

In my opinion the “GAO Questions GPS Health” article in the June issue focuses too much on the IIF as the potential problem. The May 14–15 National Space-Based PNT Advisory Board meeting heard a presentation from the DoD on GPS issues and challenges. During the briefing, Brigadier General Hyten acknowleged (as asserted in the GAO report) that there are three somewhat equally scary risks: delay of IIF, delay of OCX contract award, and delay of GPS IIIA. In the GAO report, the real doomsday scenario (in the 2015–2017 time frame) was from a two-year slide on the GPS IIIA program. You should also be aware that the graphs in the GAO report don’t account for two mitigation tools the DoD has in reserve: retired satellite still in space that could be revived (there are three at the moment), and power management as a means to extend satellite life.

I’m less worried about the first graph in the report that shows a dip in the 2010 time frame than I am about the catastrophic dip in the second chart around the 2015 time frame. I think we have a good chance of having fired our silver bullets by that time and will be much more constrained with respect to available mitigations. It is good you are writing about this as it raises awareness of the issue which could aid in the development of a more robust risk mitigation plan before this becomes a crisis.

I have been somewhat troubled by the anti-IIF program bias in the overall dialog on the subject. I don’t have full visibility or historical knowledge of what all went wrong there; what I do know indicates there was plenty of culpability to go around between the contractor and the government. I am concerned that too much focus on publicly spanking IIF will detract from fixing the root causes of the dilemma we are in: the requirements development processes and acquisition programs applied to GPS are broken. That is exacerbated by a lack of stable policy with respect to the long-term strategy for GPS development and sustainment. There are definitely lessons to learn from the IIF experience. But the difficulties associated with that program should be seen for what they are: symptoms rather than the root cause.

— Name Withheld