Security & Surveillance

Directions 2013: The Future of GNSS Security

December 1, 2012By

The GNSS interference session this year at the ION-GNSS conference in Nashville was one of the most crowded, confirming the need of all sectors of the community to understand the threats in GNSS and how they can be mitigated. In that context I received one of the most challenging questions of my career: “Can we predict the future of GNSS security?” What is the status of civil and commercial GNSS security today? Which are the threats and risks and how they are mitigated? Where are we going and what shall we expect from the future? read more

Tip Line Encourages Public Participation in the Fight Against GPS Jammers

November 2, 2012By

Washington, D.C. — The Federal Communications Commission’s Enforcement Bureau today launched a dedicated jammer tip line – 1-855-55-NOJAM (or 1-855-556-6526) – to make it easier for the public to report the use or sale of illegal GPS, cell phone or other signal jammers. It is against the law for consumers to use, import, advertise, sell or ship a GPS or... read more

ITT Exelis Announces New Capability in GPS Interference, Detection and Geolocation

September 19, 2012By

ITT Exelis has announced what it calls a significant development in the field of GPS technology. Exelis GPS Interference, Detection and Geolocation (IDG) will provide near real-time geolocation of intentional and unintentional GPS jamming sources through a network of sensors and advanced geolocation technology, the company announced at ION-GNSS, being held this week in Nashville, Tennessee. “From security to transportation... read more

This article is tagged with and posted in Defense, Defense News, Government News, Public Safety, Security & Surveillance

Drone Hack: Spoofing Attack Demonstration on a Civilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

August 1, 2012By
drone_toc-650

By Daniel Shepard, Jahshan A. Bhatti, and Todd E. Humphreys  Unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) used in the spoofing tests; owned by the University of Texas.  A radio signal sent from a half-mile away deceived the GPS receiver of a UAV into thinking that it was rising straight up. In this way, the UAV’s dependence on civil GPS allowed the... read more

Detecting False Signals with Automatic Gain Control

April 1, 2012By
FIGURE 6. Google Earth view of testing environment.

A component of most GPS receiver front-ends, the automatic gain control (AGC) can flag potential jamming and spoofing attacks. The detection method is simple to implement and accessible to most GPS receivers. It may be used alone or as a complement other anti-spoofing architectures. This article presents results from a baseline AGC characterization, develos a simple spoofing detection method, and demonstrate the results of that method on receiver data gathered in the presence of a live spoofing attack. read more

Straight Talk on Anti-Spoofing: Securing the Future of PNT

January 1, 2012By
Spoofing

Disruption created by intentional generation of fake GPS signals could have serious economic consequences. This article discusses how typical civil GPS receivers respond to an advanced civil GPS spoofing attack, and four techniques to counter such attacks: spread-spectrum security codes, navigation message authentication, dual-receiver correlation of military signals, and vestigial signal defense. Unfortunately, any kind of anti-spoofing, however necessary, is a tough sell. read more

Tamper Resistance

April 1, 2011By
P-1

Modern GNSS will provide access control to the signal through spreading-code encryption and/or authentication at the navigation data level. This will require support within the receiver for secure cryptographic keys and the implementation of security functions. This article reviews vulnerabilities of these security functions, and reviews design considerations to mitigate attacks. read more

This article is tagged with and posted in Government, Public Safety, Security & Surveillance, Transportation

Assessing the Spoofing Threat

January 1, 2009By
Humphrey_opener

A portable spoofer implemented on a digital signal processor mounts a spoofing attack, characterizes spoofing effects, and suggests possible defense tactics. GNSS users and receiver manufacturers should explore and implement authentication methods against sophisticated spoofing attacks. read more

This article is tagged with and posted in Public Safety, Security & Surveillance